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EQUAL PROTECTION AND GENDER-BASED
DISCRIMINATION: MICHAEL M V
SUPERIOR COURT
ICHAEL M.,I a seventeen-year-old male, engaged in sexual in-
tercourse with Sharon, a sixteen-year-old female, during a pro-
miscuous interlude on a park bench in Rohnert Park, Sonoma
County.2 The State of California charged Michael with violating section
261.5 of the California Penal Code, which proscribes "an act of sexual
intercourse accomplished with a female not the wife of the perpetrator,
where the female is under the age of 18 years. ' 3 Michael sought dismissal
of the complaint on the grounds that section 261.5 created a gender classi-
fication discriminatory to males and violative of state and federal equal
protection laws.4 The trial court denied Michael's motion to dismiss and
the California Court of Appeal summarily denied his request for enjoin-
ment from further prosecution.5 The California Supreme Court, by a nar-
row majority, 6 denied Michael any relief and upheld the statutory
classification as furthering a compelling state interest.7 Michael M. ap-
pealed to the United States Supreme Court. Held, affirmed: the gender
classification embodied in section 261.5 of the California Penal Code is
sufficiently related to legitimate state objectives and, therefore, does not
violate the equal protection clause. Michael M. v. Superior Court, 101 S.
Ct. 1200, 67 L. Ed. 2d 437 (1981).
I. GENDER BASED CLASSIFICATIONS AND THE EVOLUTION OF
INTERMEDIATE SCRUTINY
The equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment, 8 which Jus-
1. The name Michael M. is a pseudonym used in juvenile proceedings to retain ano-
nymity pursuant to California appellate court policy. Brief for Petitioner at 2 n. 1, Michael
M. v. Superior Ct., 101 S. Ct. 1200, 67 L. Ed. 2d 437 (1981).
2. Although the petitioner admitted to the allegations in the complaint, some question
existed as to whether the act of sexual intercourse was forced or consensual. Force is not a
requisite element of unlawful intercourse under § 261.5 of the California Penal Code. CAL.
PENAL CODE § 261.5 (West Supp. 1981).
3. Id.
4. Under California's statute only males can be held liable for unlawful sexual inter-
course irrespective of which party is the aggressor. Id
5. Michael M. v. Sonoma County, 25 Cal. 3d 608, 601 P.2d 572, 159 Cal. Rptr. 340
(1979).
6. 25 Cal. 3d at 613, 625, 601 P.2d at 576, 583, 159 Cal. Rptr. at 344, 351. The court
split four to three in rejecting the equal protection challenge.
7. Id. at 610, 601 P.2d at 573, 159 Cal. Rptr. at 341.
8. U.S. CONST. amend. XVI, § I provides: "No State shall ... deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." Id
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tice Holmes referred to as "the last resort of constitutional arguments,"9
became a major interventionist tool of the Warren Court in the late
1960s.10 The Warren Court developed a two-tiered approach to the equal
protection analysis, differentiating between those statutory classifications
that require review under the rational basis or mere rationality test and
those that necessitate application of strict judicial scrutiny.I The rational
basis test requires a showing that the statutory classification bears some
reasonable relation to a legitimate legislative purpose.' 2 The second tier,
or strict scrutiny test, operates when the Court determines that the legisla-
tive distinction constitutes a suspect classification' 3 or infringes upon a
fundamental right or interest. ' 4 The strict scrutiny test demands a showing
that the legislative classification is necessary to further a compelling state
9. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 208 (1927). Justice Holmes's comment epitomizes the
early Court's refusal to encroach upon the legislative domain historically associated with
equal protection. Typically, the due process clause was used to invalidate state legislation
while the equal protection clause only required a broadening of the statute's impact. See G.
GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 670 (10th ed. 1980).
10. For an extensive review of the equal protection developments in the later years of
the Warren Court, see Developments in the La--Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1065
(1969).
11. See Gunther, In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Modelfor a
Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972): "The Warren Court embraced a
rigid two-tier attitude. Some situations evoked the aggressive 'new' equal protection, with
scrutiny that was 'strict' in theory and fatal in fact; in other contexts, the deferential 'old'
equal protection reigned, with minimal scrutiny in theory and virtually none in fact."
12. The basic rationality standard of review was articulated in Lindsley v. Natural Car-
bonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78 (1911):
1. The equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not take
from the State the power to classify in the adoption of police laws, but admits
of the exercise of a wide scope of discretion in that regard, and avoids what is
done only when it is without any reasonable basis and therefore is purely arbi-
trary. 2. A classification having some reasonable basis does not offend
against that clause merely because it is not made with mathematical nicety or
because in practice it results in some inequality. 3. When the classification
in such a law is called in question, if any state of facts reasonably can be
conceived that would sustain it, the existence of that state of facts at the time
the law was enacted must be assumed.
The Court restated the rational basis test more recently in New Orleans v. Duke, 427 U.S.
297, 303 (1976): "Unless a classification trammels fundamental personal rights or is drawn
upon inherently suspect distinctions such as race, religion, or alienage, our decisions pre-
sume the constitutionality of the statutory discriminations and require only that the classifi-
cation challenged be rationally related to a legitimate state interest."
For a thorough analysis of the requisite relationship between legislative classifications and
objectives, see Tussman & tenBroek, The Equal Protection ofthe Laws, 37 CALIF. L. REV.
341 (1949).
13. The classic definition of suspect classification, first enunciated in United States v.
Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938), describes the need to protect "discrete and
insular minorities." See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944), in which the
Court explicitly referred to race as a suspect criterion yet upheld a post World War II statu-
tory classification based upon race and ancestry. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. I
(1966), and Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971), in which statutory schemes based
upon race and alienage, respectively, were held to be suspect classifications and subject to
strict scrutiny. But see Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291 (1978), in which a New York statute
based upon alienage was not subjected to strict scrutiny.
14. See Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972) (free speech); Shapiro v. Thompson,
394 U.S. 618 (1969) (freedom of interstate travel); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964)




Prior to 1971 the Court upheld gender-based classifications under the
deferential treatment of the rational basis standard of review. 16 In Reed v.
Reed,17 however, the Court broke from its tradition of crediting gender-
based clasifications with a presumption of validity. Under the guise of the
deferential rationality standard,' 8 the Court reviewed a state statutory
scheme that favored males over females in the selection of administrators
of intestate estates.19 A unanimous Court required the gender-based clas-
sification to have some "fair and substantial relation to the object of the
legislation" 20 and struck down the statute as an "arbitrary legislative
choice." 2' While refusing to apply a strict scrutiny standard, the Court's
decision gave rise to an unarticulated, heightened scrutiny of sex
classifications. 22
The Court reexamined the emerging "mid-level" scrutiny in Fronuiero v.
15. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 655 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting), for a
critical evaluation of the compelling interest doctrine in the latter years of the Warren Court.
Justice Harlan criticizes this doctrine as creating too great an exception to the equal protec-
tion rule by placing the Court in the role of a "super-legislature." Id at 661.
16. Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948), provides a classic example of the Court's
deference to gender-based classifications prompted by traditional beliefs in sex-defined
roles. See also Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961) (upholding statute exempting women
from jury duty). But see United States v. Dege, 364 U.S. 51 (1960) (revealing some aware-
ness of sexual equality in holding both husband and wife capable of conspiracy).
17. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
18. The Court cited F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920), as the
applicable standard: "[T]he classification must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest
upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the
legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike." 404 U.S. at 76.
19. Under the Oregon statute, eligible persons were grouped into eleven categories ac-
cording to their relationship to the decedent; the categories were ranked in an order that
would be determinative if selection between two competing applicants became necessary. If
the applicants were of opposite sex, a mandatory preference for males applied without re-
gard to individual qualifications. 404 U.S. at 73.
20. Id at 76.
21. The Court recognized the legitimate objective of reducing the work load on probate
courts and avoiding intra-family controversy, but held that the end product, sexual discrimi-
nation, was forbidden by the equal protection guarantee. Id at 76-77.
22. Although the Court purported to apply the deferential equal protection standard,
clearly a more vigorous scrutiny of gender classifications was evolving. See Wilkinson, The
Supreme Court, The Equal Protection Clause, and the Three Faces of Constitutional Equality,
61 VA. L. REV. 945, 983 (1975). Several commentators have analyzed this emerging form of
middle level review. Professor Gunther suggests the implementation of an "intensified
means" scrutiny, in which the Court should defer to legislative purpose while closely scruti-
nizing the relationship between the classification and the purpose. See Gunther, supra note
1I, at 20-25. This approach would offer some protection from arbitrary classifications, but
would avoid encroachment upon the government's power to choose legislative ends. Id
Professor Nowak advocates a demonstrable basis standard in which the Court reviews both
the purported objective and the means used to achieve that goal. Under this test a classifica-
tion is upheld "only upon a showing of a demonstrated rational means of advancing an
interest capable of withstanding analysis." See Nowak, Realigning the Standards of Review
Under the Equal Protection Guarantee-Prohibited, Neutral, and Permissive Classifications,
62 GEO. L.J. 1071, 1081 (1974). See also Simsom, .4 Methodfor Analyzing Discriminatory
Effects Under the Equal Protection Clause, 29 STAN. L. REV. 663, 678-82 (1977), for a test
that balances the individual burden imposed by a statutory classification against the societal
benefits to be realized.
1981]
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Richardson .23 Four members of the Court defined sex as a suspect classifi-
cation 24 and applied the strict scrutiny test to a gender-based statute that
allowed servicemen automatic benefits for their dependent wives, but de-
nied servicewomen the same benefits without proof of their spouse's de-
pendency.2 5 The plurality refused to accept administrative convenience as
a legitimate legislative rationale for a sex-based classification. 26 Justice
Brennan, speaking for the plurality, found implicit support for such a clas-
sification in the unanimous Reed decision. Brennan recalled the longhis-
tory of discrimination against women and determined the immutable
characteristic of sex to be sufficient justification for the suspect criteria. 27
Four other Justices refused to characterize sex as a suspect classification;
instead, they applied the heightened scrutiny in Reed to invalidate the stat-
ute.28 Although the Court later retreated from the Frontiero plurality's
characterization of sex as a suspect classification,29 it continued to rely on
the Reed rationale to proceed beyond a perfunctory examination of legisla-
tive choice.30
The already unclear standard of constitutional scrutiny became even
more obscured when the Court confronted statutory discrimination against
men.3' In Kahn v. Shevin32 a plurality of the Court upheld a statute that
granted an annual property tax exemption to widows but not to widow-
23. 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
24. Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Douglas, White, and Marshall, aligned sex with
the suspect criteria because, unlike the nonsuspect status attributed to intelligence and physi-
cal disability, sex is an immutable characteristic that seldom bears any relationship to one's
ability to contribute to society. Id at 686.
25. Id at 680. Justice Brennan purported to employ a strict scrutiny analysis, but failed
to mention any need for a compelling state interest. See Nowak, supra note 22, at 1078.
26. 411 U.S. at 690. The government conceded that the only reason for the classifica-
tion was administrative convenience. The Court found this repugnant to the equal protec-
tion safeguard. Id at 688.
27. Id at 686-87.
28. Chief Justice Burger and Justices Powell, Stewart, and Blackmun refused to expand
the rationale of Reed to include sex as a suspect class, reserving any such interpretation for
future decisions. Id at 691-92 (Powell, J., concurring). Justice Powell cited the movement
in state legislatures for the adoption of the equal rights amendment as justification for such
a deferral. Accordingly, he viewed a judicial decision as an unnecessary preemption of the
legislative process. Id at 692.
29. See Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1975), in which the Court invalidated a Utah
child support law that prescribed different majority ages for males and females. The Court
undercut its Frontiero holding, finding "it unnecessary... to decide whether a classification
based on sex is inherently suspect." Id at 13. Under the rational basis rule articulated in
Reed, the Court struck down the statute as based upon archaic sexual stereotypes. Id at 14-
17.
30. See, e.g., Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975) (invalidating Social Secur-
ity benefits provision under Reed test); Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975) (striking
down statute providing women automatic exemption from jury duty); Cleveland Bd. of
Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974) (holding mandatory maternity leave violative of equal
protection clause).
31. Statutory discrimination against males is often referred to as benign or reverse dis-
crimination. It typically is exercised to correct a pattern of discrimination against a person
or class or to assist selected groups shown to be disadvantaged. See, e.g., Regents of the
Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
32. 416 U.S. 351 (1974).
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ers. 33 While purporting to follow Reed, the plurality held that the legisla-
ture's intention to reduce the long history of economic disparity and job
discrimination between men and women through a benign classification
was an important governmental objective that justified the statute's dis-
criminatory nature.34 In Schlesinger v. Ballard35 the court rejected a male
naval officer's challenge to a military promotion system favoring females.36
The majority noted the history of dissimilarity in career opportunities for
male and female line officers and upheld the statute under the "fair and
substantial relation" test of Reed 37 Justice Brennan dissented, urging the
adoption of sex as a suspect classification and the application of a strict
scrutiny standard. 38 In Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld39 the Court invalidated a
provision of the Social Security Act that denied benefits to a widower upon
the death of his covered wage earner, but provided benefits for widows in
an analogous situation.40 The Court skirted the issue of reverse discrimi-
nation, however, by finding an unjustifiable discrimination against the sur-
viving children based solely upon the sex of the surviving parent.4 '
In the cases following Reed v. Reed the Supreme Court invalidated gen-
der-based classifications that clearly would have survived under the defer-
ential rational basis analysis.42 The full Court, however, refused to
33. 1943 Fla. Laws, ch. 21742, §1(7) (repealed 1971) offered widows an annual $500 tax
exemption, but afforded widowers no analogous benefit.
34. Justice Douglas, a member of the plurality in Front/ero, refused to declare sex a
suspect classification when the applicable statute discriminated against men. He distin-
guished the statute in Front/ero by comparing its sole purpose of administrative conven-
ience" to Florida's legitimate objective of reducing economic disparity between the sexes.
416 U.S. at 355. Justices Brennan and Marshall, two other members of the Frontiero plural-
ity, dissented and continued to push for the suspect classification of sex and the use of the
strict scrutiny standard. They challenged the Florida statute as "plainly overinclusive" and
called for a narrowing of the class of beneficiaries to those widows actually affected by the
economic discrimination of the past. Id at 360. Only Justice White's dissent plainly con-
demned the statute as discriminatory against men. Id at 361.
35. 419 U.S. 498 (1975).
36. The system affords to women officers a 13-year tenure before mandatory discharge
for want of promotion. 10 U.S.C. § 6401(a) (1976). Males are discharged after they have
been passed over for promotion twice, even if they have less than 13 years of commissioned
service. Id § 6380(a).
37. 419 U.S. at 508.
38. Justice Brennan's dissent was skeptical of the validity of the statute under the ra-
tional basis standard as well: "I find nothing in the statutory scheme or the legislative his-
tory to support the supposition that Congress intended. . . to compensate women for other
forms of disadvantage visited upon them by the Navy." Id at 511.
39. 420 U.S. 636 (1975).
40. 42 U.S.C. § 402(g) (1976).
41. 420 U.S. at 651. The Court refused to accept the government's contention that the
statute created a benign classification designed to compensate women for their past eco-
nomic disadvantages. Justice Powell's concurring opinion suggested that such a scheme dis-
criminated against women by affording them less protection for their survivors than for the
survivors of male wage earners. Id at 654.
For a critical analysis of this case as well as Kahn and Ballard, see Erickson, Kahn, Bal-
lard, and Wiesenfeld", A New Equal Protection Test in "Reverse" Sex Discrimination Cases?,
42 BROOKLYN L. REV. 1 (1975).
42. See notes 16-41 supra and accompanying text. See also USDA v. Moreno, 413 U.S.
528 (1973) (invalidating restriction in Food Stamp Act); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438
(1972) (striking down state law prohibiting sale of contraceptives to single persons).
1981]
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consider sex a suspect classification and to subject discriminatory statutory
schemes to strict scrutiny.4 3 In Craig v. Boren44 the Court appeared to
resolve the issue of choosing an applicable standard of review in sex dis-
crimination cases by adopting an intermediate level of scrutiny.4 5 The
Court struck down an Oklahoma statute that discriminated against males
by prohibiting the sale of 3.2% beer to males under the age of twenty-one
and females under the age of eighteen.46 The Court held that "[t]o with-
stand constitutional challenges . . .classifications by gender must serve
important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to
achievement of these objectives. '47 In Craig the Court placed the burden
on the government to prove both the importance of its asserted objective
and the substantial relation between the classification and that objective.4 8
Justice Powell, in concurrence, hesitated to acknowledge the adoption of a
middle tier approach but recognized that a more intense rational basis
standard of review normally applies when examining a gender-based
classification.49
In Califano v. Goldfarb50 the Court reaffirmed its commitment to the
new standard applicable in gender classification cases by invalidating a
Social Security provision predicated on stereotypical notions of female
spousal dependency. 5' In Orr v. Orr52 the Court recognized concern for
reverse discrimination against males and applied the intermediate scrutiny
standard to invalidate a state law requiring husbands but not wives to pay
alimony.53 The Court also used what appeared to be a middle tier in three
43. See notes 28-41 supra and accompanying text.
44. 429 U.S. 190 (1976). For discussion of the significance of this decision, see Com-
ment, Gender-Based Discrimination and a Developing Standard o/ Equal Protection Analysis,
46 U. CIN. L. REV. 572 (1977); Case Comment, Gender-Based Discrimination and EqualPro-
tection: The Emerging Intermediate Standard, 29 U. FLA. L. REV. 582 (1977).
45. 429 U.S. at 197.
46. 37 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 37, §§ 241, 245 (West Supp. 1980-1981) (amended 1976).
47. 429 U.S. at 197 (emphasis added). Craig restated in more emphatic terms the "fair
and substantial relationship" standard articulated in Reed.
48. Id at 204.
49. Id at 210 n.* (Powell, J., concurring). Justice Powell refused to endorse the "mid-
dle-tier" characterization of the Craig holding and the attendant subdivision of the equal
protection analysis, but he did acknowledge the need for an intensified review of gender-
based classifications. Id Justice Stevens strongly urged the Court to refrain from applying
various standards to "one Equal Protection Clause" when in reality a single standard was
being applied in "a reasonably consistent fashion." Id at 211-12 (Stevens, J., concurring).
Justice Rehnquist, in dissent, favored the traditional rational basis test as the applicable
standard in gender-based classifications. He emphasized the absence of any prior disadvan-
tage or discrimination towards males that might necessitate a stricter application of scrutiny.
Rehnquist regarded the new standard's subjective terms "substantial' and "important" as
inviting preferential treatment of certain types of legislation. Id at 217-28.
50. 430 U.S. 199 (1977).
51. The statute provided survivor benefits to widows but denied them to widowers un-
less the deceased wife had provided at least half of the couple's support. Id at 199-200.
Justice Rehnquist, in dissent, again emphasized a deferential treatment of benign classifica-
tions. He found no invidious discrimination against males, but urged the court to apply a
sharper scrutiny only when sex distinctions disadvantaged women, historically "the victims
of unfair treatment.' Id at 239-42.
52. 440 U.S. 268 (1978).
53. Justice Brennan warned of the latent dangers of "benign" gender classifications that
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cases involving gender and illegitimacy classifications.5 4 The Court strictly
adhered to the new mid-level standard in Wengler v. Druggists Mutual In-
surance Co. 55 and struck down a statute that required widowers whose
wives died in work related accidents to prove dependency as a condition to
receipt of workmen's compensation benefits but imposed no such require-
ment on similarly situated widows. 56 More recently the Court applied the
Craig test to a Louisiana statute that gave husbands unilateral control over
the disposition of community property.57 The statute failed to survive the
criterion mandated by the new standard.5 8
In the line of decisions following Craig, a majority of the Justices
ascribed to an accepted definition for an intermediate standard of review
based on the substantial relation between gender-based legislative classifi-
cations and important governmental objectives. The recurrent application
of the intermediate standard after the Craig decision suggested that the
Court had adopted a consistent, though somewhat elusive standard of re-
view for sex discrimination cases.
II. MICHAEL M V SUPERIOR COURT
In Michael M. v. Superior Court the Supreme Court again confronted an
equal protection challenge to a gender-based classification. The Court re-
"carry the inherent risk of reinforcing stereotypes about the 'proper place' of women and
their need for special protection." Id at 283. He asserted that a state cannot classify on the
basis of sex when gender-neutral classifications serve the legislative intentions just as effec-
tively. Id
54. In Lai v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259 (1978), the Court upheld a statute requiring paternal
acknowledgment of illegitimate children before they could qualify as heirs to their father's
intestate estate. The Court, without expressly defining a level of scrutiny, employed a realis-
tic form of review comparable to Craig's middle level analysis. Id at 266-76. The dissent
also applied a degree of scrutiny greater than the rational basis test in evaluating the rela-
tionship between the classificaton and the legislative ends. They disagreed, however, with
the majority's assessment of the significance of the purported state interest in orderly prop-
erty disposition. Id at 277 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
In Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347 (1979), the Court refused to invalidate a statute al-
lowing the father to sue for the wrongful death of an illegitimate child only if the mother
was deceased and the father had initiated legitimization proceedings prior to the child's
death. The Court treated this classification as gender based and held that a state lacks the
authority to make sweeping generalizations based on sex that do not reflect any differences
between the sexes or degrade the ability or social status of the protected class. Id at 354.
The Court stated further: "[I]n cases where men and women are not similarly situated,
however, and a statutory classification is realistically based upon the differences in their
situations, this Court has upheld its validity." Id Justice Powell concurred in much of the
analysis of the plurality, but advocated a direct application of the Craig intermediate stan-
dardof review. Id at 359.
The Court in Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979), struck down a New York law
that required pre-adoption consent by the mother of an illegitimate but denied equal con-
sent rights to the father. Caban represented the first gender-illegitimacy case in which a
majority opinion was rendered applying the intermediate scrutiny test. See Comment, Equal
Protection and the Putative Father.- An Analysis of Parham v. Hughes and Caban v. Moham-
med, 34 Sw. L.J. 717 (1980).
55. 446 U.S. 142 (1980).
56. Id at 144-46.
57. Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 101 S. Ct. 1195, 67 L. Ed. 2d 428 (1981).
58. Id at 1199, 67 L. Ed. 2d at 433-34.
1981]
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treated from the sensitivity toward reverse discrimination exhibited in ear-
lier cases59 to uphold a California statutory rape law that punishes males
only.60 Justice Rehnquist, writing for the plurality, 6' held that the pro-
posed governmental objective, prevention of illegitimate teenage
pregnancies, was "sufficiently related to the State's objectives to pass con-
stitutional muster. ' 62 The plurality examined empirical data that docu-
mented the increase in teenage pregnancies over the past two decades, and
the attendant social, medical, and economic hardships borne by the
mother, her child, and the state.63 The Court concluded that "young men
and women are not similarly situated with respect to the problems and the
risks of sexual intercourse," 64 and, thus, the state acts within its legislative
authority when it punishes only the participant who suffers less severely
the natural consequences of his conduct.65
The plurality began its analysis by recognizing the Court's previous dif-
ficulty in agreeing upon the proper standard of review for gender-based
classifications. 66 Justice Rehnquist reiterated the Craig test of "a substan-
tial relationship" to "important governmental objectives," but he appeared
to qualify the application of that test by citing a series of cases that upheld
gender classifications that realistically reflected the dissimilarity of the
sexes in certain circumstances. 67 Granting substantial deference to the leg-
islative motive behind the classification, 68 the plurality recognized a
59. See notes 52-54 supra and accompanying text.
60. See note 3 supra and accompanying text. The Court cited numerous cases in which
lower federal courts and state courts have upheld statutory rape laws as constitutional. 101
S. Ct. at 1203 n.l, 67 L. Ed. 2d at 441 n.1.
61. Justice Rehnquist was joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart and
Powell.
62. 101 S. Ct. at 1203, 67 L. Ed. 2d at 441.
63. The Court noted that two-thirds of the one million pregnancies in the 15-19 age
group in 1976 were illegitimate and that approximately one half of these pregnancies ended
in abortion. The risk of maternal death was higher than normal and the economic future of
these mothers was bleak. Id at 1205 nn. 3-5, 67 L. Ed. 2d at 443 nn. 3-5.
64. Id at 1205, 67 L. Ed. 2d at 444.
65. Id at 1206, 67 L. Ed. 2d at 445. The Court found the exclusion of females from a
statutory scheme that sought to protect only them logical. Id
66. Unlike the California Supreme Court, the plurality refused to find sex a suspect
classification and apply a strict scrutiny standard. Justice Rehnquist purported to apply the
intermediate standard enunciated in Craig, but the dissenters voiced some concern over the
accuracy of the plurality's application. Id at 1204, 67 L. Ed. 2d at 442. See notes 83-96
infra.
67. The Court cited Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347 (1979), Califano v. Webster, 430
U.S. 313 (1977), Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975), and Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S.
351 (1974), as recent cases in which the Court recognized situations where the sexes were
dissimilar and a statutory classification discriminating against men therefore was not invidi-
ous. 101 S. Ct. at 1204, 67 L. Ed. 2d at 442-43. The Court quoted Weinberger v. Wiesen-
feld, 420 U.S. 636, 653 (1975), in holding that a legislature may provide for the special
problems of women. 101 S. Ct. at 1204, 67 L. Ed. 2d at 442-43.
68. The petitioner argued that the true purpose of the California statute was to protect
the virtue and chastity of young women: "California's pregnancy prevention argument is a
hindsight catchall rationalization futilely used to justify a vestige of bygone attitudes about
the proper roles of the sexes." Brief for Petitioner at 5, Michael M. v. Superior Ct., 101 S.
Ct. 1200, 67 L. Ed. 2d 437 (1981). The Court responded with a deferential quote from
United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 383 (1968): "[Ilt is a familiar principle of constitu-
[Vol. 35
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profound disparity between the risks that males and females incur by en-
gaging in sexual intercourse. 69 The plurality reasoned that pregnancy
serves as a natural deterrent for women, and "[a] criminal sanction im-
posed solely on males thus serves to roughly equalize the deterrents on the
sexes."
70
The plurality rejected the petitioner's contention that the statute was im-
permissibly underinclusive in failing to hold females criminally liable. 71
Instead, the Court accepted the state's argument that a gender-neutral stat-
ute would frustrate enforcement because of the female's reluctance to re-
port a violation that would subject herself to a criminal prosecution. 72 The
Court similarly discarded the petitioner's argument that the statute was
impermissibly overbroad because it criminalized sexual intercourse with
females who were incapable of impregnation. At the time of the violation
the petitioner was under eighteen, and he argued that the statute was
flawed because it created a presumption that as between two persons under
eighteen years of age the male was the culpable aggressor.73 The Court
dispensed with this assertion, holding that the age of the male was irrele-
vant to the harm sought to be prevented.74
While the plurality in Michael M recognized that the case involved re-
verse discrimination against males, it found no past discrimination or pe-
culiar disadvantage deserving of the Court's benevolence. 75 The gender
classification, according to the plurality, was not made merely for adminis-
trative convenience, 76 nor was it based upon archaic sexual stereotypes. 77
Rather, the statute "reasonably reflects the fact that the consequences of
tional law that this Court will not strike down an otherwise constitutional statute on the
basis of an alleged illicit legislative motive." 101 S. Ct. at 1206 n.7, 67 L. Ed. 2d at 444 n.7.
69. Id. at 1205, 67 L. Ed. 2d at 444.
70. Id at 1206, 67 L. Ed. 2d at 445.
7 1. Id The petitioner argued that a gender-neutral statute would effectuate the legisla-
tive goals equally well. The Court, however, citing Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351, 356 n.10
(1974), held that statutory line-drawing need not be absolutely precise, but only within con-
stitutional limitations. Id at 1206, 67 L. Ed. 2d at 445.
72. Id at 1206-07, 67 L. Ed. 2d at 445. The Court noted:
The question whether a statute is substantially related to its asserted goals is at
best an opaque one. It can be plausibly argued that a gender-neutral statute
would produce fewer prosecutions than the statute at issue here ....
Where such differing speculations as to the effect of a statute are plausible,
we think it appropriate to defer to the decision of the California Supreme
Court, "armed as it was with the knowledge of the facts and the circumstances
concerning the passage and potential impact of [the statute], and familiar with
the milieu in which that provision would operate."
Id at 1207 n.10, 67 L. Ed. 2d at 445 n.10 (quoting Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 378-79
(1967)). (emphasis in original).
73. Brief for Petitioner at 18, Michael M. v. Superior Ct., 101 S. Ct. 1200, 67 L. Ed. 2d
437 (1981).
74. 101 S. Ct. at 1207, 67 L. Ed. 2d at 446. Justice Rehnquist asserted that the statute
did not rest upon the assumption that males are generally the aggressors, but rather reflected
a legislative attempt to provide an additional deterrent for men. Id
75. The Court alluded to the rationale used in earlier decisions to uphold several statu-
tory classifications that favored females. See notes 29-33 supra and accompanying text.
76. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 690 (1973).
77. See Off v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 283 (1979).
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sexual intercourse and pregnancy fall more heavily on the female than the
male." 78
Justice Stewart's concurring opinion echoes the sentiments of the plural-
ity decision. He contends that the state's sanction against males realisti-
cally reflects the physiological differences in the sexes. 79 According to
Justice Stewart, the Constitution recognizes this disparity, and no violation
of the equal protection clause occurs providing these differences are not
used to disguise invidious discrimination. 80 Justice Blackmun, also con-
curring, purported to uphold the statute under the mid-level scrutiny test
of Craig and its progeny. 8' Without explanation, however, Justice Black-
mun declared the state's attempt at controlling the sexual activities of
young people "a sufficiently reasoned and constitutional effort to control
the problem at its inception. 82
Justice Brennan, in a dissenting opinion joined by Justices White and
Marshall, voiced his concern over the majority's failure to apply accurately
the equal protection analysis "so carefully developed since Craig v. Bo-
ren." 8  The dissenters expressed fears that the plurality was overempha-
sizing the desirability of achieving the statutory objective of preventing
teenage pregnancy and underemphasizing the fundamental question of
whether the gender-based discrimination in the California statute was sub-
stantially related to the achievement of that objective. 84 The dissent ar-
gued that the government had failed to prove both the importance of its
asserted objective and the substantial relationship between the classifica-
tion and that objective. 85 Justice Brennan further asserted that the State of
California had failed to show that a gender-neutral statutory rape law
would be less effective in deterring teenage pregnancies than the ex-
isting gender-based law. 86 The Brennan dissent found unpersuasive the
state's assertion that significant enforcement problems would accompany a
gender-neutral statute87 and declared that the state's inability to produce
78. 101 S. Ct. at 1208, 67 L. Ed. 2d at 447.
79. Id. at 1210-11, 67 L. Ed. 2d at 450.
80. Id. at 1209-10, 67 L. Ed. 2d at 449-50.
81. Id at 1211, 67 L. Ed. 2d at 451. Blackmun cites Schlesinger, Weinberger, and Kahn
as exemplifying this test. Id See notes 32-41 supra and accompanying text, however, sug-
gesting that these cases may have applied less than the mid-level scrutiny implicit in Reed.
82. 101 S. Ct. at 1211, 67 L. Ed. 2d at 451.
83. Id at 1214 n.2, 67 L. Ed. 2d at 454 n.2; see notes 44-58 supra and accompanying
text.
84. Id at 1214, 67 L. Ed. 2d at 454. Justice Brennan enumerated all the cases in which
the Craig analysis was developed and noted that the test applied whether the classification
discriminated against males or females. Id at 1214-15, 67 L. Ed. 2d at 455.
85. Id. at 1214 n.2, 67 L. Ed. 2d at 454 n.2.
86. The Brennan dissent quoted Wengler v. Druggists Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142
(1980), in which the Court emphasized this governmental prerequisite to survival of a consti-
tutional challenge to a gender-based classification. 101 S. Ct. at 1215, 67 L. Ed. 2d at 455.
87. Id at 1216, 67 L. Ed. 2d at 456. The dissent found two serious flaws in the plural-
ity's acceptance of the state's assertion that a gender-neutral statute would be less effective
because of enforcement problems. First, Justice Brennan noted that the plurality's argument
is less convincing when juxtaposed with the experience of the majority of other jurisdictions.
At least thirty-seven states have enacted gender-neutral statutory rape laws. The laws of
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sufficient evidence was a failure to meet its burden under the Craig test.88
Justice Brennan also looked closely at the historical development of Cali-
fornia's statutory rape law and found that the state objective of pregnancy
prevention was of recent origin, 9 suggesting that the statute was founded
upon outmoded sexual stereotypes rather than the reduction of teenage
pregnancies. 90 Thus, Justice Brennan argued, the state was unable to show
a substantial relation to an important governmental objective.9'
Justice Stevens's dissent sounded a pessimistic note, asserting the futility
of the notion that a statutory prohibition would have a significant effect on
the prevalence of teenage sexual activity.92 Justice Stevens refuted the plu-
rality's acceptance of the risk of pregnancy as an effective deterrent to fe-
males and regarded the exemption of the more victimized class of females
as totally irrational. 93 In applying a standard of review, he noted that
when the natural differences between men and women are relevant per-
haps these situations deserve a stricter form of scrutiny than in other sex
discrimination cases.94 Ultimately, he was unable to justify the disparate
treatment of the two participants without a legislative determination that
one was more guilty than the other.95 Furthermore, Justice Stevens found
such a statutory authorization of punishment of only one of two equally
guilty parties offensive to the constitutional notion of impartial sovereign
rule.9
6
Arizona, Florida, and Illinois in particular permit prosecution for minors of either sex who
engage in consensual sexual conduct. See ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1405 (1978); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 794.05 (West 1976); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 11-5 (Smith-Hurd 1979). In
addition, California has revised other sections of its Penal Code to make them gender-neu-
tral. 101 S. Ct. at 1216, 67 L. Ed. 2d at 456-57. Secondly, Justice Brennan believed that
common sense suggested a ender-neutral statute was a more powerful deterrent of sexual
activity because it subjectedtwice as many persons to arrest and had a deterrent effect on
twice as many potential violators. Id at 1216-17, 67 L. Ed. 2d at 457.
88. Id at 1216, 67 L. Ed. 2d at 457-58.
89. The Brennan dissent noted that "[i]t was only in deciding Michael M. that the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court decided, for the first time in the 130-year history of the statute, that
pregnancy prevention had become one of the purposes of the statute." Id at 1217-18 n.10,
67 L. Ed. 2d at 458 n.10.
90. Id In People v. Verdegreen, 106 Cal. 211, 214, 39 P. 607, 608-09 (1895), the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court first articulted the statute's objective:
The obvious purpose of [the statute] is the protection of society by protecting
from violation the virtue of young and unsophisticated girls .... It is the
insidious approach and vile tampering with their persons that primarily un-
dermines the virtue of young girls, and eventually destroys it; and the preven-
tion of this, as much as the principal act, must undoubtedly have been the
intent of the legislature.
91. 101 S. Ct. at 1218, 67 L. Ed. 2d at 459.
92. Id (Stevens, J., dissenting). "Local custom and belief-rather than statutory laws
of venerable but doubtful ancestry-will determine the volume of sexual activity among
unmarried teenagers." Id
93. Id at 1219, 67 L. Ed. 2d at 461.
94. Justice Stevens adhered, however, to the single standard of review articulated in his
Craig concurrence. Id at 1219 n.4, 67 L. Ed. 2d at 460 n.4. See note 49 supra.
95. Id at 1220, 67 L. Ed. 2d at 461.
96. Stevens refuted the state's argument that the statute could survive if commonly in-
voked only in forcible rape cases, rather than when sexual activity was consensual. Stevens
suggested that the exempt class be defined by reference to "relative innocence" rather than
by reference to sex. 101 S. Ct. at 1220-21, 67 L. Ed. 2d at 462-63.
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The plurality decision and dissenting opinions in Michael M. represent a
departure from any consistent application of intermediate scrutiny that has
developed since Craig.97 Both the plurality and dissent purport to apply
the mid-level scrutiny of Craig, yet they arrive at antithetical results. The
plurality readily defers to the proposed legislative objective of preventing
teenage pregnancy and upholds a statute clearly discriminatory to males.
Justice Rehnquist recognizes the physiological differences of the sexes as a
legitimate basis for the statutory classification. As urged in his Craig dis-
sent,98 Justice Rehnquist finds no archaic stereotypes or past discrimina-
tion against males requiring the Court's reconciliation and a stricter
application of scrutiny. As a result, the plurality, while paying lip-service
to the Craig standard, appears to apply a more deferential analysis of the
mid-level test than is typically employed in female discrimination cases. 99
The dissent, however, asserts another element of the equal protection
analysis. Justice Brennan finds implicit in the mid-level scrutiny test a
burden upon the legislature to prove that a gender-neutral statute is less
effective than the existing gender-specific statute. According to Justice
Brennan, the inability to satisfy this essential prerequisite is a failure under
the "substantial relation" criterion of the Craig analysis. The dissent rests
upon the state's failure to meet this burden and the plurality's superficial
inquiry into this area of the equal protection test. These differing opinions
reflect the Court's indecision in settling on a consistent reading of the
Craig standard of review. Such varied interpretations of the requirements
of the Craig test for gender-based classifications serve only to obfuscate the
uniform application of a mid-level analysis.
III. CONCLUSION
Since the Craig decision, the Court has not hesitated to apply intermedi-
ate scrutiny and invalidate gender-based classifications that discriminate
against archaic female stereotypes. The plurality in Michael M. v. Superior
Court, however, appears to have renewed its previous ambivalence toward
gender-based classifications that discriminate against males. If the Court
is ever to adopt a consistent standard of review for gender-based classifica-
tions, it will have to overcome this reluctance and refuse to perpetuate
male as well as female stereotypes.
Drew Alan Campbell
97. See notes 44-57 supra and accompanying text.
98. See note 49 supra and accompanying text.
99. Justice Rehnquist, however, in asserting that the government has a "strong" interest
in preventing pregnancy, appears at least to recognize the Craig standard, and his opinion
suggests a compromise of his previous view that only a rational basis is necessary to justify a
gender-based classification. 101 S. Ct. at 1205, 67 L. Ed. 2d at 478. See also Rostker v.
Goldberg, 101 S. Ct. 2646, 69 L. Ed. 2d 478 (1981), in which Justice Rehnquist, writing for
the majority, upheld Congress's decision to authorize only males for draft registration as
reasonably reflecting the dissimilarity of the sexes. Id at 2658-59, 67 L. Ed. 2d at 495.
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